Legal Analysis of the Pahalgam Incident: An International Law Perspective on the India-Pakistan Dispute

Legal Analysis of the Pahalgam Incident: An International Law Perspective on the India-Pakistan Dispute

 

Prepared by: Legal Team of AB LawFirm & Lex & Juris Barristers and Legal Consultants

Lead Author: Mr. Asadullah Hashmi Advocate, Founder AB LawFirm, Managing Partner Lex & Juris

 

I. Introduction

The complex and historically contentious relationship between Pakistan and India continues to be a focal point in South Asian geopolitics and international legal discussions. Since their independence and partition in 1947, both countries have engaged in multiple wars, skirmishes, and diplomatic standoffs—many revolving around the region of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pahalgam incident, a recent and controversial attack occurring in the Indian-occupied region of Kashmir, has once again brought tensions to a boiling point. India has accused Pakistan of orchestrating the attack, while Pakistan has denied any involvement, demanding a transparent and neutral international investigation.

Importance of Pahalgam incident in 2025

Importance of impartiality and adherence to international lawThis paper aims to analyze the Pahalgam incident through the lens of international law. We will evaluate the legal questions arising from the incident, such as the attribution of responsibility, the standards of proof required, and possible violations of international treaties and norms. The central focus lies in understanding how international legal frameworks, including the UN Charter, ICJ precedents, and binding bilateral treaties like the Simla Accord and Indus Waters Treaty, govern the conduct of both nations.

With both countries being nuclear-armed states, the consequences of misinformation, misattribution, and escalation could be catastrophic—not just for South Asia but for global peace and security. Therefore, legal and diplomatic avenues must be exhausted before conflict escalates.

This paper is authored by the legal team of AB LawFirm and Lex & Juris Barristers and Legal Consultants, under the leadership of Mr. Asadullah Hashmi, Advocate. With our team’s expertise in international law, treaty obligations, and conflict resolution, we propose a constructive legal framework for resolution and accountability.

Factual Background: The Pahalgam Incident On 22 April 2025,a coordinated and deadly attack occurred in the Pahalgam region of Indian-administered Kashmir, resulting in the deaths of numerous innocent civilians. The Indian government was quick to attribute responsibility to Pakistan-based militant groups, allegedly supported by the Pakistani state without any evidence. Within an hour of the incident, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement condemning the “terror attack” and labeled it an act of cross-border terrorism.

Pakistan’s official response and calls for investigation

Allegations of false flag operation In stark contrast, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically denied any involvement and condemned the attack as a heinous crime. It called for an impartial and independent investigation by a neutral international body. Pakistan further suggested the formation of a joint inquiry commission, potentially under the supervision of the United Nations or a neutral third country such as Switzerland, Turkey, or Qatar.

II. Attribution and Responsibility Under International Law

At the heart of any international dispute involving acts of violence across borders lies the issue of attribution: determining who is responsible for the act in question. In the case of the Pahalgam incident, international law requires a high threshold of evidence before a state can be held responsible for an act carried out by non-state actors. This section examines the applicable legal standards for attribution, the question of state responsibility, and the types of evidence required under international legal norms.

A. Standard of Proof for Attribution

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has addressed the issue of attribution in several landmark cases, including the Nicaragua v. United States (1986) case and the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007) genocide case.

In Nicaragua, the ICJ held that for actions by non-state actors to be attributable to a state, it must be shown that the state had “effective control” over the non-state actors in question. This is a high standard, requiring evidence that the state directed or enforced the specific operations that led to the violations.

In the Bosnia case, the ICJ reaffirmed this principle and added that merely supplying funding, weapons, or logistical support does not automatically render a state responsible.

Application to the Pahalgam Incident:

India must prove that Pakistan exercised effective control over the group responsible for the attack.

Mere allegations of the group’s origin or ideological sympathies are insufficient under international law.

B. Types of Credible Evidence Required

International legal standards require states to provide concrete, verifiable, and corroborated evidence before assigning state responsibility:

Communications or orders from state officials to militants.

Satellite imagery or intercepted communication showing cross-border infiltration.

Proof of state funding, training camps, or official protection.

In the case of the Pahalgam incident, India has thus far failed to provide such specific and verifiable evidence in public or at international forums.

C. Non-State Actors and International Responsibility

Under the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), particularly Articles 8 and 11, a state can be held responsible if:

It directs or controls the group (Article 8).

It subsequently acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own (Article 11).

Without satisfying these stringent conditions, the conduct of non-state actors cannot be legally attributed to a state.

D. Case Studies in Attribution and Responsibility

Example 1: Iran Hostages Case (1980)

The ICJ held that Iran was responsible not merely for the actions of student militants, but because it later endorsed their actions and failed to protect the U.S. embassy, thus violating international obligations.

Example 2: Bosnia Genocide Case (2007)

The ICJ refused to attribute the actions of Bosnian Serbs to Serbia due to lack of effective control, even though Serbia supported them politically and financially.

Example 3: Tadić Case (ICTY, 1999)

The Appeals Chamber adopted a broader “overall control” test in contrast to the ICJ’s “effective control” test. Although this broader standard applied within international criminal law, the ICJ reaffirmed its stricter threshold in later state responsibility cases.

Example 4: Congo v. Uganda (2005)

Uganda was found responsible for the unlawful presence of its troops in the DRC and for violations of human rights and humanitarian law. This case highlighted the duty of occupying powers to control not only state troops but also non-state actors operating in concert.

Example 5: Wall Advisory Opinion (2004)

The ICJ criticized Israel’s construction of a wall in the West Bank and emphasized that states must respect the territorial integrity of others and not support actions—directly or indirectly—that result in violations of international law.

E. False Flag Operations and Legal Repercussions

If the Pahalgam attack is later proven to be a false flag operation—i.e., conducted by Indian elements to appear as though perpetrated by Pakistan—this would amount to:

A serious breach of international law, including the prohibition on the use of force.

A violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, potentially entitling it to reparations.

Propaganda and misinformation, which undermines the integrity of international peace and security mechanisms.

Such conduct, if proven, may constitute a deliberate attempt to provoke conflict under the guise of self-defense, thus falling under unlawful aggression as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8 bis).

F. Legal Defenses Under International Law

If a neutral international investigation concludes that India conducted the Pahalgam attack as a false flag operation or falsely attributed it to Pakistan without credible evidence, Pakistan would have several legal defenses and remedies available under international law:

Violation of Sovereignty

Pakistan could invoke international legal forums (ICJ, UNGA, UNSC) to assert that India violated its sovereignty through false attribution and malicious propaganda.

The wrongful imputation of terrorist acts could qualify as an unlawful act under ARSIWA, entitling Pakistan to claim reparations and demand a formal apology.

Demand for Reparations

Following the principles in the Factory at Chorzów Case (1928, PCIJ), a state found guilty of an internationally wrongful act must make full reparations for the damage caused.

Pakistan could seek moral, political, and economic reparations due to the harm inflicted on its international image and bilateral relations.

Right of Counterclaim

Under Article 22 of the UN Charter, Pakistan can file a counter-claim if its integrity and peace are compromised.

Pakistan may seek a declaration from the ICJ against India for its misuse of international norms and institutions.

Invocation of the Principle of Abuse of Rights

India’s manipulation of international legal principles, such as self-defense or state responsibility, could amount to an abuse of rights under customary international law.

International Condemnation and Sanctions on India

Pakistan could initiate diplomatic campaigns and resolutions at OIC, UNGA, and regional forums to isolate India diplomatically and economically.

Preventive Legal Action and Security Assurance

Pakistan could approach the UNSC for security guarantees under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially given the nuclear status of both countries and the threat to global peace.

Position of Pakistan

Pakistan’s consistent demand for a neutral investigation demonstrates its commitment to transparency.

Its refusal to escalate without concrete evidence reflects its adherence to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (prohibition on use of force) and peaceful dispute resolution under Article 33.

Pakistan can leverage its cooperation with counter-terrorism bodies like FATF and its compliance with international norms to strengthen its legal and moral standing.

• Legal Support from Expert Bodies

Pakistan can formally engage international legal experts and institutions, such as the International Commission of Jurists, UNHCR, and independent legal consultancies like Lex & Juris, led by Mr. Asadullah Hashmi Advocate, to represent its case at global forums.

III. Legal Defenses and Remedies for Pakistan if India is Found Guilty of the Pahalgam Attack or If India Attacks Pakistan

If India is found guilty of conducting or facilitating the Pahalgam attack, or if India escalates the situation through direct military action, Pakistan has several legal defenses and remedies at its disposal under international law. This section explores Pakistan’s position in light of international treaties, the UN Charter, and customary international law, and outlines the potential legal actions it could take to defend its sovereignty and security.

A. Legal Defenses to Allegations if India Attacks Pakistan

i. Right to Self-Defense

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Pakistan has the inherent right to self-defense if it faces an armed attack. This defense is a core principle of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter, which permits states to defend themselves against armed aggression. In the event of an Indian attack, Pakistan could invoke self-defense as a legal justification for retaliatory measures. However, the response must be proportionate and necessary to repel the attack.

Example 1: Nicaragua v. United States (1986): The ICJ emphasized that self-defense must be in proportion to the armed attack. A disproportionate or excessive use of force could be deemed unlawful.

Example 2: Israel’s 1967 Preemptive Strike: Israel justified its preemptive strike against neighboring Arab states by invoking the right to self-defense, but the UN Security Council questioned the legitimacy of such preemptive actions under international law.

ii. Prohibition of Use of Force and Non-Intervention

Pakistan could also assert that India’s attack is in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations except in cases of self-defense. India’s unprovoked aggression would therefore constitute a breach of this prohibition. Furthermore, Pakistan can rely on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as articulated in Resolution 2131 (XX) of the UN General Assembly (1965).

Example 1: The Corfu Channel Case (1949): The ICJ ruled that Albania’s actions in allowing the use of force against British ships in its waters were unlawful under international law, reinforcing the prohibition on the use of force.

Example 2: The U.S. Attack on Iraq (2003): The U.S. invasion of Iraq was controversial and faced legal challenges for violating the principle of non-intervention, with many nations viewing it as unlawful under the UN Charter.

iii. Protection of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

If India attacks Pakistan, it would also be violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, principles enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. Pakistan could seek legal remedies through the UN Security Council or other international bodies to address this violation.

Example 1: The Falklands War (1982): Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands was deemed a violation of Britain’s sovereignty, leading to an armed conflict under the principle of territorial integrity.

Example 2: The 1991 Gulf War: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was deemed a violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty, and the UN Security Council authorized military action under the principle of collective security.

B. Remedies Available to Pakistan

i. Diplomatic and Legal Redress

In the case of a violation of its sovereignty or if India is found guilty of the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan could seek several remedies, including:

Diplomatic protests: Pakistan can lodge formal protests through diplomatic channels, demanding India cease any unlawful activities.

International arbitration: Pakistan could pursue arbitration through international legal mechanisms, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which has been used to resolve interstate disputes.

UN Security Council (UNSC) Intervention: Pakistan can bring the issue before the UNSC to demand sanctions or intervention to stop the aggression, as seen in cases like the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait dispute.

ii. Filing a Case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

If India’s actions constitute a breach of international law, Pakistan could initiate proceedings against India at the ICJ under the UN Charter and customary international law. The ICJ has jurisdiction over matters of state responsibility, including violations of treaties, human rights, and the use of force.

Example 1: The 2008 Mumbai Attacks (India v. Pakistan): Pakistan was sued for its alleged involvement in harboring militants, and the ICJ ruled that states have a responsibility to prevent terrorist activities on their soil.

Example 2: Nicaragua v. United States (1986): Nicaragua sued the U.S. for funding rebel groups in Nicaragua. The ICJ ruled that the U.S. violated international law by intervening in Nicaraguan sovereignty.

iii. Pursuing Claims for Reparations

If India is found guilty of false attribution or conducting a false flag operation (or other unlawful activities), Pakistan could claim reparations for the damages incurred. This could include:

Compensation for loss of life and property.

Reparations for damage to Pakistan’s international reputation caused by wrongful allegations and attacks.

Restitution of territorial sovereignty if any Indian action infringed upon Pakistani territory.

iv. Countermeasures

In addition to legal claims, Pakistan can also take countermeasures under the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility. These countermeasures must be proportionate and aimed at inducing India to comply with its international obligations.

Example 1: The Case of the SS “Lotus” (1927): The Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that countermeasures may be taken by a state in response to a breach of international law, provided they do not exceed the limits of proportionality.

v. United Nations and Regional Security

Pakistan may also seek support from international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). These bodies can provide diplomatic pressure, help mediate the dispute, and bring attention to the situation on the global stage.

Example 1: The 1971 Bangladesh War: India’s intervention in the Bangladesh Liberation War, supported by the UN, has been cited as an example of UN intervention in conflicts involving aggression and violations of territorial sovereignty.

vi. Protection Under the Geneva Conventions

If the conflict escalates into armed conflict, Pakistan could also seek to enforce its rights under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), particularly the Geneva Conventions. Any use of force must adhere to IHL principles, including the prohibition of targeting civilians and the obligation to treat prisoners of war humanely.

Example 1: The 1999 Kargil War: India and Pakistan both faced criticism for violations of IHL during the Kargil War. The Geneva Conventions demand that both countries respect the laws of war, including protections for civilians and prisoners.

vii. International Legal Consequences of Indian Aggression or False Flag Operations: If India’s actions are found to be a violation of international law, including false flag operations or aggression, there could be serious consequences:

1. Legal accountability: India could face charges for breaching international norms, including wrongful use of force or acts of terrorism.
2. Sanctions or economic penalties: The UNSC or regional bodies such as the OIC could impose sanctions on India, which could include diplomatic isolation, trade restrictions, or financial penalties.
3. Damages for violations: If India is found guilty, Pakistan could demand reparations or compensation for the harm caused by unlawful actions, either through diplomatic negotiations or legal action at the ICJ.

D. Diplomatic Actions for Pakistan in Response to India’s Actions in the Pahalgam Dispute

Diplomatic actions represent one of the most effective tools at Pakistan’s disposal for addressing and mitigating the consequences of India’s alleged involvement in the Pahalgam attack or any subsequent military actions. Diplomatic engagement can help resolve conflicts, reduce tensions, and potentially avoid an all-out military confrontation. This section explores the key diplomatic avenues that Pakistan could pursue if India is found guilty or if India attacks Pakistan, and how these strategies align with international law.

Bilateral Diplomatic Engagement

Direct Dialogue and Negotiations

The most straightforward and peaceful way to resolve disputes between India and Pakistan is through direct negotiations. Bilateral talks could be initiated either through high-level summits, such as between the heads of state, or through diplomatic channels involving foreign ministers or special representatives. The primary objectives of these talks would be:

De-escalation of tensions: The primary goal would be to prevent an escalation of the situation, particularly if the conflict is beginning to border on full-scale military confrontation.

Clarification of accusations: Pakistan could request an official clarification from India regarding the Pahalgam incident, especially if India is attributing the attack to Pakistani state involvement. This could help deconstruct the false accusations if India’s allegations are not backed by evidence.

Confidence-building measures: These could include border demilitarization, trade and transport agreements, and increased communication to reduce misunderstandings or provocations.

Example 1: The Lahore Declaration (1999): One of the more successful bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, the Lahore Declaration aimed to establish a framework for peace, the non-use of nuclear weapons, and the improvement of bilateral relations. However, the success of such measures hinges on the political will of both parties.

Example 2: The 2004 Composite Dialogue: This process sought to address all contentious issues, including Kashmir, nuclear confidence-building measures, and cross-border terrorism. Though it was suspended after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, it showcased the potential of dialogue to address complex issues.

Diplomatic Notes and Formal Protests

If India engages in hostile actions or falsely attributes the Pahalgam attack to Pakistan, Pakistan could issue formal diplomatic protests, lodging demarches or notes verbales to express its disagreement and request clarifications. These diplomatic notes can:

1. Demand that India cease its hostile actions or allegations.
2. Call for an investigation into the allegations of state responsibility in the Pahalgam attack.
3. Request that India de-escalate the situation and abide by international norms and the principle of peaceful dispute resolution.

Example 1: Pakistan’s Response to the 2001 Indian Parliament Attack: After the attack on India’s Parliament in 2001, Pakistan issued diplomatic protests denying any involvement and calling for greater international cooperation to address terrorism. This move helped establish Pakistan’s stance in the international community.

Track-II Diplomacy

Track-II diplomacy involves unofficial, non-governmental dialogue channels, often led by former diplomats, academics, or independent experts. This form of diplomacy allows for:

1. A more flexible and informal exchange of ideas, which can help break impasses.
2. Creation of backdoor negotiationsthat might lead to breakthroughs where formal diplomatic channels have failed.

Example 1: The India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis (1990s): During the 1990s, backchannel diplomacy involving trusted intermediaries played a critical role in averting a potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan.

International Diplomatic Channels

Engagement with the United Nations

If the situation escalates or India attacks Pakistan, Pakistan could bring the issue to the United Nations (UN) through various mechanisms:

UN Security Council (UNSC): Pakistan could call for a special session of the UNSC to address the situation. The UNSC has the authority to authorize collective action, impose sanctions, or issue resolutions condemning the use of force or violations of international law.

UN General Assembly (UNGA): Pakistan could raise the issue in the UNGA to gain global support and highlight India’s alleged actions to the international community. This would also bring global attention to the situation, especially in the context of Pakistan’s concerns about its sovereignty.

UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC): If human rights violations are involved (e.g., in the event of cross-border violence against civilians or military reprisals), Pakistan could bring the issue to the UNHRC to ensure international scrutiny and accountability.

Example 1: The 1965 India-Pakistan War: Pakistan took the issue of India’s aggression to the UNSC, resulting in the Tashkent Agreement, which called for a ceasefire and a return to the status quo before the conflict.

Engagement with Regional Organizations (e.g., SAARC, OIC)

Pakistan can leverage its relationships with regional organizations to exert diplomatic pressure on India and garner support:

1. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): Pakistan could seek a regional dialogue through SAARC, highlighting India’s alleged violation of regional norms. Though SAARC has often been hindered by India-Pakistan tensions, it remains a platform for multilateral diplomacy.
2. Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): Given the OIC’s support for Pakistan on Kashmir and other regional issues, Pakistan could call upon the OIC to condemn India’s actions, especially if they involve violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty or human rights concerns in the disputed regions. The OIC could call for peace and work towards a resolution based on the UN’s principles.

Example 1: OIC’s Support for Pakistan on Kashmir: The OIC has historically supported Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute and called for international intervention. In 2019, the OIC held an emergency session condemning India’s actions in Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370.

Engagement with Major Powers (e.g., U.S., China, Russia)

Major powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia, often play a pivotal role in de-escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. Diplomatic engagement with these powers can take the form of:

1. Bilateral diplomatic initiatives: Pakistan can call upon countries with influence over India, such as the U.S. or Russia, to mediate or exert pressure on India to de-escalate.
2. Multilateral diplomatic pressure: The U.S. or China could raise the issue in international forums such as the G20or BRICS, encouraging both parties to adhere to international law and prevent conflict escalation.

Example 1: The U.S. and Pakistan in the 1990s: The U.S. played a crucial role in urging both India and Pakistan to agree to a nuclear test moratorium during the 1998 nuclear crisis, helping prevent further escalation.

Public Diplomacy and Media Campaigns

Pakistan can also engage in public diplomacy through:

1. Media campaigns: Using international media outlets to raise awareness about the situation, and publicly presenting its case regarding India’s unlawful actions, especially in the context of the Pahalgam incident.
2. Engaging civil society: Pakistan can mobilize global civil society, human rights organizations, and influential thinkers to pressure India to adhere to international norms.

Example 1: The Kashmir Conflict and International Media: Pakistan has frequently used international media platforms to highlight human rights abuses in Kashmir and India’s alleged violations of international law. This has garnered sympathy and support from the global community, particularly in the West.

Multilateral Diplomatic Engagement

Regional Confidence-Building Measures

Pakistan can propose regional confidence-building measures (CBMs) through multilateral organizations to reduce the likelihood of further conflict. These measures could include:

Hotlines between military establishments to prevent misunderstandings or accidental escalations.

Joint anti-terrorism initiatives to address cross-border terrorism issues that may be contributing to the tension.

Agreement on nuclear safety and transparency: Given the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan, multilateral talks could focus on transparency and avoiding accidental use of nuclear weapons.

Example 1: The 1998 Lahore Declaration and Confidence-Building Measures: Pakistan and India agreed on several confidence-building measures, including the establishment of nuclear risk-reduction mechanisms, in an effort to avoid military confrontation.

Through these diplomatic actions, Pakistan could effectively safeguard its national interests, seek international support, and contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. These strategies would also work in conjunction with potential legal measures, helping to create a multifaceted approach to the Pahalgam dispute.

V. Legal Analysis of the Simla Accord (1972)

a. Nature of the Treaty

The Simla Accord, signed on 2 July 1972 between India and Pakistan following the 1971 war, is a bilateral and legally binding treaty under international law. It established a framework for the normalization of relations, emphasized peaceful resolution of disputes, and stipulated that both countries would respect the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir without prejudice to their recognized positions.

b. Treaty Interpretation Under the Vienna Convention

Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (VCLT), to which both India and Pakistan are parties:

Article 26 affirms the principle of pacta sunt servanda—that treaties must be performed in good faith.

Article 31 lays out the general rule of interpretation, requiring treaties to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms, in their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Thus, the Simla Accord must be interpreted in line with its overarching goal of achieving peaceful bilateral resolution of disputes.

c. Supersession of UN Resolutions?

India contends that the Simla Accord renders earlier UN Security Council Resolutions, especially Resolution 47 (1948), redundant by creating a new bilateral framework. However, Pakistan maintains that the UN resolutions—particularly on the right of self-determination and plebiscite—remain operative.

Under Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations under the UN Charter prevail over any other international agreement, including the Simla Accord. Thus, the Simla Accord cannot unilaterally nullify binding UNSC resolutions unless those resolutions are formally revoked by the UNSC itself.

d. Coexistence of UN Security Council Resolutions with the Simla Accord

Legal interpretation supports the coexistence of the Simla Accord with the UN Security Council resolutions. The Accord does not explicitly abrogate prior UN obligations; rather, it lays out a bilateral approach for future negotiations, which does not negate existing multilateral responsibilities.

Therefore, both legal instruments remain valid: UN resolutions as multilateral obligations under the UN Charter, and the Simla Accord as a binding bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan.

e. Dispute Resolution and ICJ Jurisdiction

The Simla Accord commits both parties to resolve disputes “bilaterally by peaceful means.” However, it does not explicitly bar recourse to international judicial forums such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Under Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, jurisdiction is based on the consent of states. While India has historically rejected third-party adjudication in the Kashmir issue, Pakistan can still raise disputes at the ICJ if jurisdiction is established by a compromissory clause or special agreement.

f. Whether Third-Party Mediation is Precluded

India argues that the Simla Accord precludes third-party intervention. However, international law does not read such provisions as absolute bars to good offices, mediation, or arbitration, especially when bilateral efforts fail.

Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General and other international actors retain the right to offer mediation under Article 33 of the UN Charter, which lists negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement among the peaceful means to resolve disputes.

g. Exceptions to the Bilateralism Principle

International law recognizes exceptions to strict bilateralism where:

Human rights and self-determination are involved (e.g., the Kashmiris’ right under international law).

One party acts in bad faith or unilaterally obstructs negotiations.

Regional or international peace and security are at stake.

In such cases, third-party mediation or multilateral intervention may be deemed necessary.

h. Breach and Remedies

A breach of the Simla Accord—such as violation of the LoC or refusal to engage in peaceful dialogue—can trigger state responsibility under international law.

Remedies for breach include:

Diplomatic protest and demands for compliance.

Recourse to UN forums or international adjudication.

Countermeasures under Articles 49–54 of ARSIWA, provided they are proportionate and reversible.

i. India’s Actions and Consequences Under International Law

India’s unilateral revocation of Article 370 and alteration of Jammu and Kashmir’s status in August 2019 arguably violates the Simla Accord’s commitment to maintaining the LoC status quo and resolving disputes peacefully.

Under international law, such actions may:

Constitute a material breach of the treaty.

Invite international scrutiny and pressure.

Reopen the legal validity and urgency of implementing UNSC resolutions.

Pakistan may thus seek legal remedies and diplomatic support to counteract India’s actions, asserting that India has undermined both bilateral commitments and multilateral obligations.

VI. Legal Framework of the Indus Waters Treaty (1960)

a. Treaty Obligations and Binding Nature

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, brokered by the World Bank and signed by India and Pakistan, is a binding international treaty that allocates the use of the Indus River system between the two countries. Under its terms, India received rights to the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej), while Pakistan retained control over the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). The treaty imposes strict obligations on both states, requiring notification, cooperation, and non-interference with each other’s allocated waters. As a binding agreement under international law, the treaty falls under the category of pacta sunt servanda—agreements must be kept. This principle, enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), compels parties to respect and fulfill treaty obligations in good faith. The treaty’s durability—surviving wars and diplomatic crises—illustrates its robustness and the critical nature of water-sharing for regional peace. Any violation or unilateral suspension of its provisions by India could amount to a serious breach of international obligations, prompting legal repercussions under the broader framework of international treaty law.

b. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, provides the legal scaffolding for interpreting and enforcing treaties such as the IWT. Article 26 of the VCLT affirms that treaties are binding and must be performed in good faith. Article 60 details the conditions under which a treaty may be terminated or suspended due to a material breach. However, unilateral withdrawal is heavily restricted, especially for treaties with a significant impact on regional or global peace. Article 62 permits termination based on a fundamental change of circumstances but sets a high threshold for its application. The IWT does not include an express withdrawal clause, making it subject to the customary international law obligations codified in the VCLT. Therefore, India cannot unilaterally abrogate or suspend the treaty without breaching international law. This has been reiterated by the World Bank and legal scholars who emphasize the sanctity of such long-standing agreements, especially those concerning vital resources like water.

c. Unilateral Suspension: Legal or Not?

India has occasionally hinted at suspending the IWT, particularly following cross-border tensions. However, under the VCLT and general principles of international law, unilateral suspension of a treaty—especially one as critical and interdependent as the IWT—is not legally permissible without just cause. A state’s dissatisfaction or political grievances do not constitute lawful grounds for suspension. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and past precedents like the Gabcíkovo–Nagymaros Project case (Hungary/Slovakia, 1997) underscore that even grave environmental or political changes must meet stringent criteria to justify suspension. India’s invocation of security concerns must therefore be evaluated under legal standards—not political expediency. If India unilaterally suspends water flows, it could face accusations of using water as a geopolitical tool, potentially violating the principles of equity, no-harm, and sustainable use recognized in customary international law and codified in documents like the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997).

d. Material Breach and Article 60 of VCLT

A material breach, according to Article 60 of the VCLT, involves the repudiation of a treaty or the violation of a provision essential to the treaty’s object and purpose. For the IWT, the essential purpose is equitable water distribution and peaceful coexistence. Any attempt by India to withhold or divert water from the Western Rivers could qualify as a material breach. Such a breach permits the aggrieved party, i.e., Pakistan, to invoke the right to suspend or terminate its obligations or to seek remedies through legal and diplomatic channels. It also opens the door for third-party intervention and international adjudication. India’s actions could thereby trigger a reevaluation of its credibility under international treaty law, while Pakistan would be well within its rights to approach legal forums such as the ICJ or PCA for redress and enforcement.

e. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The IWT provides a multi-tiered dispute resolution framework, emphasizing dialogue and peaceful settlement. It begins with bilateral negotiation through the Permanent Indus Commission. If unresolved, disputes escalate to the World Bank, which can appoint a Neutral Expert or refer the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). This layered mechanism underscores the treaty’s emphasis on legalism over confrontation. The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project dispute (2013) is a landmark example, where the PCA ruled in favor of Pakistan’s core concerns, affirming its right to certain water flows. By engaging these mechanisms, both parties have historically demonstrated a willingness to resolve conflicts within the treaty’s legal boundaries. Any bypassing of this framework, especially by unilateral action, would signal a breach of not just the IWT but of the international rule of law.

f. Role of World Bank, PCA, Neutral Expert

The World Bank serves as a guarantor of the IWT and plays a key role in appointing neutral experts or constituting arbitration panels. The Bank’s continued involvement affirms the treaty’s binding character. The Neutral Expert mechanism is invoked for technical issues, while the PCA handles complex legal questions. In the Kishanganga case, the PCA found that India must ensure minimum downstream flows to Pakistan, validating Pakistan’s claims and showcasing the effectiveness of this legal recourse. The World Bank’s refusal to entertain India’s attempt to block Pakistan’s legal rights reflects the strength of legal multilateralism. This institutional architecture fortifies the treaty’s legal enforceability and prevents unilateral abuse by either party.

g. Legal Consequences of Water Diversion

If India diverts Western River waters in contravention of the IWT, it could face multiple legal consequences. Such diversion would amount to a violation of Pakistan’s sovereign rights, triggering state responsibility under ARSIWA and customary international law. The action could also breach the no significant harm principle in international water law. Pakistan may claim reparations for economic and humanitarian harm, particularly if agriculture, health, and livelihoods are adversely affected. The action may also qualify as eco-aggression, an emerging concept in international environmental law. A formal claim at the ICJ or PCA could force India to reverse its actions, compensate Pakistan, and face diplomatic backlash from the international community.

g. Potential Claims by Pakistan

If India is found in breach, Pakistan may pursue claims for legal, economic, and reputational damages. Legal remedies include arbitration under the PCA and litigation at the ICJ, provided jurisdictional hurdles are cleared. Economic claims may include compensation for agricultural losses, reduced hydroelectric output, and environmental degradation. Reputationally, Pakistan may highlight India’s non-compliance in international forums, seeking support from allies and organizations like the OIC and the UN. Drawing from precedents like the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) and Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957), Pakistan’s legal position would be bolstered by well-established principles of transboundary harm and equitable water sharing.

i. Humanitarian and Environmental Law Violations

Water diversion affects not just interstate relations but also fundamental human rights and environmental norms. Deprivation of water access can lead to famine, disease, and displacement—potential violations of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and customary humanitarian law. Environmentally, unregulated projects may breach obligations under Rio Declaration, Convention on Biological Diversity, and Stockholm Declaration. If diversion results in the degradation of wetlands or fisheries, it could invoke responsibility under Ramsar Convention. Therefore, Pakistan could claim violations under both human rights and environmental law, seeking legal and diplomatic remedies.

VII. Consequences if India is Found Guilty

a. Pahalgam Attack & False Attribution Liability

If India is found guilty of orchestrating or falsely attributing the Pahalgam attack to Pakistan, it would face serious liability under international law. False flag operations constitute a form of abuse of rights, violating the principle of good faith in international relations. Such actions may amount to internationally wrongful acts under the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).

Legal Concept of Abuse of Rights

The doctrine of abus de droit prevents states from using rights in a manner that causes unjust harm to others. Misusing counter-terrorism narratives to malign another state violates the United Nations Charter, customary international law, and general principles of international cooperation.

Claim for Reparations

Pakistan would be entitled to reparations under international law, including satisfaction (acknowledgment of the breach), guarantees of non-repetition, and material compensation for economic, diplomatic, and reputational losses. These claims may be pursued before the ICJ or other international forums.

Diplomatic Consequences

A finding of guilt would seriously damage India’s diplomatic credibility. Bilateral relations, especially with Islamic nations, could deteriorate. Multilateral forums like the UN, OIC, and SAARC may issue condemnations or suspend cooperation.

International Credibility and UN Standings

India’s role in peacekeeping, its G20 ambitions, and its standing in international forums could be compromised. A state found guilty of staging attacks to defame others may face marginalization, loss of moral authority, and calls for independent scrutiny.

Sanctions and Soft Power Loss

While formal sanctions may be difficult, India could face soft sanctions, such as suspension from key diplomatic dialogues, reduced defense collaborations, and reputational damage impacting trade, tourism, and cultural influence.

b. Indus Waters Treaty

Breach of International Treaty

If India is found guilty of breaching the IWT, it would be in material breach of a legally binding treaty under Article 60 of the VCLT. Such breach enables Pakistan to suspend obligations and seek international remedies.

Consequences under VCLT

India’s unilateral actions without exhausting dispute mechanisms would violate Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda) and Article 60 (material breach) of the VCLT. These legal violations could justify third-party intervention and international adjudication.

Compensation Claims

Pakistan could file for compensation due to reduced water flows, agricultural loss, energy deficits, and human suffering. Damages could be calculated based on precedents in transboundary harm and environmental degradation.

Acts of War or Hybrid Warfare

Deliberate water diversion may qualify as hybrid warfare or even an act of war. International legal doctrines increasingly recognize water as a strategic resource and its manipulation as a form of coercion, triggering serious legal and military implications.

Legal Doctrines on Water as a Weapon

Under international humanitarian law and environmental law, the use of water as a weapon violates the no significant harm principle and the right to life and development. It may also breach obligations under the UN Watercourses Convention.

International Condemnation

If found guilty, India would face condemnation from the UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, and international NGOs. The World Bank may issue adverse reports, and countries dependent on international water law would rally for enforcement.

VIII. Role of International Legal Mechanisms

i. UN General Assembly & Security Council

Pakistan may approach the UNGA for a resolution condemning India’s actions and call for investigations. If the matter escalates, it may be referred to the UNSC, which has the authority to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

ii.International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICJ can adjudicate legal disputes concerning false flag operations, treaty breaches, and violations of humanitarian law, provided jurisdiction is accepted. Pakistan may bring the matter under contentious jurisdiction or request an advisory opinion.

iii.Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

The OIC can play a significant role in mobilizing support from Muslim-majority countries. Resolutions, condemnations, and economic boycotts may be coordinated through this forum to increase pressure.

iv.Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

For treaty-based claims such as those under the IWT, the PCA offers a viable mechanism for arbitration. It ensures due process, neutral adjudication, and binding rulings on violations.

v.Role of Third-Party Mediators

Neutral states such as China, Turkey, Qatar, and the United States may serve as mediators or observers. Their involvement can help de-escalate tensions and promote lawful resolution of disputes through backchannel diplomacy or formal arbitration.

IX. Broader Legal and Geopolitical Implications

i. Nuclear Escalation Risks

The legal findings may heighten regional instability, especially given the nuclear capabilities of both states. International law would urge urgent de-escalation and confidence-building measures to avert unintended conflict.

ii.Impact on Global Terrorism Laws

A guilty verdict would prompt reassessment of counter-terrorism frameworks, ensuring that false flag operations are explicitly addressed in international conventions and UN Security Council Resolutions.

iii.Human Rights and Humanitarian Implications in Kashmir

Legal findings would highlight broader issues in Indian-administered Kashmir, including violations of ICCPR, ICESCR, and Geneva Conventions. International calls for a plebiscite, demilitarization, or UN monitoring could intensify.

iv.International Legal Reforms for False Flag Operations

The case could lead to legal innovations, such as clearer definitions of state-sponsored false flag attacks, stricter evidentiary standards, and new conventions addressing abuse of self-defense claims.

X. Recommendations and Conclusion

i. Call for Neutral, Independent Inquiry

An international, neutral inquiry under UN auspices must be established to investigate both the Pahalgam attack and violations of the IWT. The inquiry should include forensic, diplomatic, and legal experts.

ii.Legal Mediation by Experts including Mr. Asadullah Hashmi and Team

A team led by Mr. Asadullah Hashmi, composed of legal, diplomatic, and human rights professionals, should be appointed to assist Pakistan in pursuing lawful redress and international engagement.

iii.Restoration of Treaties and Legal Obligations

India must be compelled to return to the IWT framework, cease unlawful activities, and commit to good faith negotiations. Treaty monitoring bodies should be strengthened.

iv.Peaceful Diplomatic Resolution

Despite serious violations, both nations should be encouraged to resolve disputes through peaceful diplomacy, legal channels, and confidence-building. The international community must play a proactive role in preventing escalation and promoting lasting peace in South Asia.